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Karinne Coombes and Fiona Roughley
I. INTRODUCTION
The efforts of the UK Supreme Court in the field of human rights during its first year reflected
and informed a broader debate in society generally as to whether decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights (hereafter "EurCtHR") in Strasbourg are appropriate for the domestic context.
As the government mooted in Whitehall the merits of substituting the Human Rights Act 1998
(hereafter "HRA") with an autochthonous "British Bill of Rights", the newly-formed Supreme
Court in the old Middlesex Guildhall struggled to articulate a framework for why, when and how
the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(hereafter "ECHR"), as incorporated into UK law by the HRA, might not mean for the British
what Strasbourg says they mean for Europe.
In Manchester City Councily. Pinnock' the Supreme Court proposed a formula for dealing with
relevant Strasbourg decisions:
This Court is not bound to follow every decision of the EurCtHR. Not only would it
be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the
ability of the Court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the EurCtHR wAhich
is of value to the development of Convention law... Where, however, there is a clear
and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental
substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to
overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it
would be wrong for this Court not to follow that line.2
The formula is useful for explaining why the Court treated relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence
differently during the term. However, as helpful as the formula is for retrospectively categorising
outcomes, it may prove unworkable as a prospective guide. In particular, it is difficult to see how
the legislature, let alone a public authority for whom it is "unlawful ... to act in a way which is
incompatible with a Convention right",' will be able to determine when an aspect of domestic
law can properly be labelled "fundamental". However, as this review illustrates, it is only in excep-
tional cases that the Supreme Court supports the rejection of unambiguously direct guidance from
Strasbourg.' Yet it is the concept of "exceptionality" that is the rub. To adopt a phrase used by Lady
Hale in argument in Pinnock, "exceptionality is an outcome and not a guide".
II. "FOLLOW THAT LINE
Decisions of the Supreme Court during its first year demonstrated that British courts must not
1 [2010] UKSC 45, [2010] 3WLR 1441. A subsequent decision bythe Court on 9 February 2011 in relation to the same
matter addressed only consequential orders and costs matters and has no bearing on the present discussion: Alanchester City
Councily. Pinnock [2010] UKSC 6.
2 [2010] 3 WLR 1441, at [48], references omitted.
3 HRA, s.6(1).
4 See Part IV below
5 [2010] 3WLR 1441, at [51].
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only take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence, -which they are required to do by the HRA,6 but
they must also treat this jurisprudence as carrying significant weight and having, in many cases, a
decisive effect.
Although the decision in R (A Child) v. Secretary ofState for the Home Department was politi-
cally controversial," the judgment exhibited a standard application of "follow that line" judicial
reasoning. At issue were statutory provisions requiring all persons sentenced to 30 months' im-
prisonment or more for a sexual offence to notify the police of where they were living and their
travel abroad. With no possibility of review, the requirements operated indefinitely. The claimants
were two convicted sex offenders who were subject to the notification regime. The issue before
the Court was one of proportionality:' whether the inability to seek review of the notification
requirements rendered them a disproportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim.1 The Divi-
sional Court of the Queen's Bench held that they were disproportionate and issued declarations of
incompatibility. The Court of Appeal subsequently upheld those declarations."
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. After reviewing the relevant Strasbourg jurispru-
dence, Lord Phillips12 concluded that, because none of the Strasbourg cases directly concerned
lifetime notification requirements for sex offenders, they could not be considered "authority, bind-
ing or otherwise". Yet the Strasbourg reasoning proved decisive. In those cases, the possibility of
review of notification requirements or retention of personal information arrangements connected
with criminal procedures was considered "highly material" to the question of proportionality.1
Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the declarations of incompatibility applying to the pre-
sent applicants because "the notification requirements constitute a disproportionate interference
with article 8 rights because they make no provision for individual review".14
In Pinnock, substantial domestic authority was in direct conflict with directives from Stras-
bourg. The issue was whether article 8 of the ECHR requires a court, Which is being requested by
a local authority to order that a person be dispossessed of his home, to determine the proportional-
ity of the possession order notwithstanding that the right of occupation has, under domestic lass,
come to an end. In contrast to three House of Lords decisions," a line of Strasbourg cases" had
"well established"1 an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, Strasbourg jurisprudence
6 HRA, s.2(1).
7 [20 10] UKSC 17, [20101 2 WLR 992.
8 See, for example, Alan Travis, "David Cameron condemns supreme court ruling on sex offenders", The Guardian (16
February 2011). Available at <http://ivv.guardian. co. uk/society/201 /feb l6/david-cameron-condemns-court-sex-
offenders> (last accessed on 31 July 2011).
9 R (A Child) v. Secretaiy of State for the HRone Department [2010] 2 WLR 992 (It was common ground that: (i) the
notification requirements interfered with the claimants' article 8 ECHR rights guaranteeing respect for private and family
lives, homes and correspondence; (ii) the interference was in accordance with the law; and (iii) the notification requirements
pursued the legitimate aims of "the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" at [4]).
10 Ibid., at [41].
11 R. (IF (by his litigation friend OF) and 7onpson) v. Secretary of State fir the Homne Department [2009] EWC.A Civ 792,
[20 10] 1 WLR 76.
12 Lady Hale and Lord Clarke agreed with Lord Phillips. Lord Hope (at [59]) and Lord Rodger (at [6 ]) also agreed with
the reasons of Lord Phillips but did so subject to additional comments, none ofwhici are relevant to the role ofStrasbourg
jurisprudence in the Court's decision.
13 R. (A Child) v. Secretasy ofStatefor the Homne Department [2010] 2 WLR 992 at [34].
14 Ibid., at [57].
15 Harrow London Borough Councily. Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, [2004] 1 A.C. 983; Kayv. Lanbeth London Borough Council
[2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 A.C. 465; Doherty v. Brmi ngham City Council [2008] UKHL 57, [2009] 1 A.C. 367.
16 Manv of the Strasbourg cases concerned the UK directly: Connors v. Unitedingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 198; McCann v.
UnitedKinginsdom (2008) 47 EHRR 913; ay v. UnitedIingdom (Application no. 37341/06), 21 September 2010 (although
this case was decided after oral argument in the Supreme Court in Pinnock had concluded).
1 Manchester City Councily. Pinnock [2010] 3 WLR 1441, at [45].
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also established that -where there is a procedure for judicial review of a possession order, a "judicial
procedure which is limited to addressing the proportionality of the measure through the medium
of traditional judicial review (i.e, one which does not permit the court to make its own assessment
of the facts in an appropriate case) is inadequate for resolving sensitive factual issues"."
The Supreme Court followed the Strasbourg Court and, in doing so, articulated its "formula"
for when Strasbourg jurisprudence should be applied, notwithstanding substantial domestic au-
thority to the contrary." As discussed above, the formula leaves much unresolved. However, apply-
ing it to the facts, the Court concluded that, since there was "no question of the jurisprudence of
the EurCtHR failing to take into account some principle or cutting across our domestic substan-
tive or procedural law in some fundamental way", the Strasbourg decisions should be followed.
Consequently, the Court held that, "to be compatible with article 8. where a court is asked to make
an order for possession of a person's home at the suit of a local authority, the [UK] court must have
the power to assess the proportionality of making the order, and, in making that assessment, to
resolve any relevant dispute of fact".20 The Court also decided that, "wherever possible, the tradi-
tional review powers of the court should be expanded so as to permit it to carry out that exercise".21
The simplicity of expression masks the significant expansion of the content of traditional judi-
cial review that it represents. For dispossession cases, the powers of the review court (absent express
statutory provisions to the contrary) now extend to "reconsidering for itself the facts found by a
local authority, or indeed to considering facts which have arisen since the issue of proceedings, by
hearing evidence and forming its own view".22 Although the Court stressed that ordinarily this
right of review will have no practical utility where a local authority is entitled to possession as a
matter of domestic law,2" the more significant implications of the decision relate to judicial review
generally. "Proportionality" is a requirement of a number of articles of the ECHR, 2 and processes
of traditional judicial review are not limited in availability, nor peculiar in content, to the posses-
sion order context.
III. STRASBOURG SETS THE LIMITS
During its first year, the Supreme Court considered a number of claims that advocated ex-
panded interpretations of the substantive provisions of specific human rights and the scope of
the application of the HRA. In these instances, the Court adopted a cautious approach, broadly
indicating that it will not go beyond Strasbourg jurisprudence.
In Secretary of Defence v. Smith2 the Coutt considered, inter alia, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of human rights obligations. The central question was whether Private Smith, a British soldier
who died of hyperthermia while on a British military base in Iraq, was subject to UK jurisdiction
within the meaning of article 1 of the ECHR so as to benefit from the HRA while abroad.7 Al
18 Ibid., at [45].
19 Ibid, at [48].
20 Ibid, at [49].
21 Ibid., at [73].
22 Ibid., at [74].
23 Ibid, at [54].
24 For example, articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of
assembly and association).
25 This may be in contrast to jurisdictions that do not have an external court fulfilling a supervisory role over the domestic
court. See, for example, Olga Tellis v. Bombay MLuniipa Corporation AIR (1987) SC 180, where the Indian Supreme Court
held that the right to life includes a right to livelihood.
26 [20 10] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 A.C. 1.
2' In particular, it was argued that, insofar as the HRA requires a state to act in conformity with the Convention, the UK
was required to perform an inquest into Private Smiths death that satisfied the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the
[ 2011] 28
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though the appellant, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the respondent, the mother of the
deceased, agreed that Private Smith was within the jurisdiction of the UK, they disagreed on the
nature of that jurisdiction. The Secretary of State argued that jurisdiction under the ECHR was
primarily territorial, such that British soldiers would only be under UK jurisdiction -while on a
British base. In contrast, counsel for Mrs Smith drew a parallel with state agents, such as diplomats
and consular officials, -who remain subject to the jurisdiction of the state when exercising state
powers outside the territory of the state.2 8 Therefore, they argued, the HRA applied because Private
Smith was a member of the armed forces and his death occurred while he was on active service on
behalf of the UK.
Overturning the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal, the majority of the Supreme
Court2" held that jurisdiction under the ECHR is primarily territorial and could only be broadly
interpreted in exceptional circumstances. Since no claim could succeed under the HRA "unless
there has been a breach of a Convention right of a person within the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom that should have been secured pursuant to article 1",0 the Court considered whether,
pursuant to article 1 of the ECHR, British troops operating on foreign soil fall within UK juris-
diction. Examining EurCtHR decisions in Bankovic v. Belgium " and subsequently,2 Lord Collins
concluded" that, "article 1 reflects the territorial notion of jurisdiction, and that other bases of
jurisdiction are exceptional and require special justification". Since Mrs Smith's claim did not
fall within the classes of cases previously recognised by Strasbourg as warranting extraterritorial
application of the Convention," and the majority could find no "basis in [Strasbourg's] case law,
or in principle, for the proposition that the jurisdiction which states undoubtedly have over their
armed forces abroad both in national law and international law means that they are within their
jurisdiction for the purposes of article 1", British troops on active service overseas would only be
within UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 1 when on a British military base.
Smith highlights the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to go beyond Strasbourg jurispru-
dence. The reasoning of Lord PhillipsI representative of the majority, endorsed the view of Lord
Brown in Al-Skeini v. Secretary oJStatefor Defence," namely that article 1 should not be interpreted
as "reaching any further than the existing Strasbourg jurisprudence clearly shows it to reach",.
Since the claim that armed forces fall under the jurisdiction of the state by virtue of their per-
sonal status was novel, and in the words of Lord Phillips, no Strasbourg jurisprudence "clearly
demonstrate[d] that the contention [of Mrs Smith was] correct".40 Thus, the Court ofAppeal erred
Convention.
28 Ibid., at [33].
29 Lady Hale, Lord Mance and Lord Kerr dissented on the issue of jurisdiction.
30 R. (Secretary ofJState) v. Smith [2011] 1 A.C. I at [5], emphasis in original. Article 1 of the ECHR provides that, "[t]
ie High Contracting Parties slall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section
I of this Convention".
31 Bankot id others . Belgium and others, no. 5220V/99, 12 December 2001.
32 calan v. Turky (2003) 37 EHRR 238z (2005) 41 EHRR 985 (Grand Chamber); Asa v Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 567;
Arkoic v. Ita (2006) 44 EHRR 1045 (Grand Chamber); AlSaadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom (Admissibility)
(2009) 49 EHRR SE 95; Melvedyev v. France 29 March 2010.
33 Lords Roger and Walker agreed.
34R. (Secutary ofState) v. Smith [2011] 1 A.C. I at [305].
35 Ibid. (Namely, (i) territorial jurisdiction by a state over the territory of another contracting state; (ii) extensions of
territorial jurisdiction by analogy; and (iii) common sense extensions of the notion of jurisdiction to fit cases which plainly
should be within the scope of the Convention).
36 R. (Secretary ofSate) v. Smith [2011] 1 A.C. 1 at [307].
3' Lord Hope and Lord Brown agreed.
38 [2008] A.C. 153.
39 R. (Secuetary ofState) v. Smitb [2011] 1 A.C. I at [60] per Lord Phillips.
40 Ibid.
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in finding that Private Smith was under the jurisdiction of the UK within the meaning of article
1 when operating outside the British base in Basra, Iraq. 1 Underscoring this deference to Stras-
bourg, Lord Phillips commented that. "[t]he proper tribunal to resolve this issue is the Strasbourg
court itself, and it will have the opportunity to do so when it considers Al-Skeini". 2
Obiter remarks in R. (A) v. Croydon London Borough Council; R. (M) v. Lambeth London Bor-
ough Council4 also confirm the unwillingness of the Court to go beyond Strasbourg jurisprudence
when determining the scope of Convention rights. The claimants in this case were asylum seekers
who were separately denied accommodation available to children (i.e., persons under 18 years of
age) pursuant to section 20(1) of the Children Act 1989 because local authorities concluded that
the claimants were over 18 years old. Yet an assessment by independent doctors concluded that
they were aged 15 and 17 years respectively. On this basis, the claimants sought judicial review of
the decisions regarding their ages and entitlement to accommodation. The lower courts held that
decisions under s.20(1) of the Children Act were not reviewable. The Supreme Court allowed the
appeals, holding that the determination of age was a question of fact that may be subject to judicial
review. 4 Although obiter, the Court touched upon whether the right to accommodation is a civil
right protected by the ECHR, such that an exercise of local authority powers under section 20(1)
of the Act would engage article 6(1) of the ECHR. Lady Hale" noted that, "no Strasbourg case
had yet gone so far" as to recognise that a legislative right to be provided with accommodation
amounted to a civil right, despite the fact that this was assumed, but not decided, in a prior House
of Lords decision.4 6 Highlighting the unwillingness of the Court to go beyond Strasbourg, Lady
Hale stated that, "I would be most reluctant to accept, unless driven by Strasbourg authority to do
so, that article 6 requires the judicialisation of claims to welfare services of this kind ."
IV. STRASBOURG WILL NOT ALWAYS BE FOLLOWED
At the far end of the spectrum of how the Supreme Court addressed decisions of the EurCtHR
in its first term is R. v. Horncastle," as the Court declined to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence on
the basis that English law adequately protected the Convention right at issue and the rule laid
down by Strasbourg did not take into account existing domestic processes and was therefore not
suitable for domestic implementation.
The central question in Horncastle was whether the appellants' right to a fair trial guaranteed
by article 6 of the ECHR was breached because their convictions were based solely, or to a
decisive extent, on the statements of absent witnesses who could not be cross-examined." Existing
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 [2009] UKSC 8, [2009] 1 WLR 2557.
44 Ibid., at [32-33].
45 Lords Scott, Walker, and Neumerger agreed. Lord Hope went further than the other justices, concluding that "it can
now be asserted with reasonable confidence" that the duty to provide accommodation to children in need "does not give
rise to a 'civil right' within the meaning of article 6(1) of the Convention", at Ibid, [65]).
46 R. (A) v. Croydon London Borough Council; R. (M) v. Lambeth London Borough Council [2009] 1 WLR 2557 at [39],
citing Runa Begum v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council) [2003] 2 A.C. 430 (where the House of Lords assumed,
without deciding, that a claim to be provided with suitable accommodation under the homelessness provisions of Part VII
of the Housing Act 1996 was a civil right).
47 R. (A) v. Croydon London Borough Council; R. (M) v. Lanbeti London Borough Council [2009] 1 WLR 2557 at [44].
Lady Hale ultimately concluded that, even if the right to accommodation existed as a civil right, the procedures in place
were sufficient to meet the requirements of article 6(1) of the Convention, at [45].
48 [2009] UKSC 14, [2010] 2 A.C. 3-3.
49 At issue were articles 6(1), which provides that, "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
[ 2011] 30
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Strasbourg jurisprudence - including the Chamber decision in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The
UK" concerning the very same domestic legislation - determined that article 6 would be violated
when convictions are based solely, or to a decisive extent, on hearsay evidence." In Horncastle,
the appellants challenged convictions for which hearsay evidence was admitted52 pursuant to
the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which contained certain safeguards but lacked the exclusionary
rule established by Strasbourg. A unanimous Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that
although the HRA requires domestic courts to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into account," there
may be rare instances in which they could refuse to follow its lead. 14
Providing extensive reasons, the Court held that the Strasbourg Court's sole or decisive rule was
unnecessary and not suitable for English criminal law because the legislative safeguards established
"in the interests of justice"" by Parliament "strike the right balance" between fair trials and the
interests of victims and society for criminals to "not be immune from conviction where a witness,
who has given critical evidence in a statement that can be shown to be reliable, dies or cannot
be called to give evidence for some other reason."' 'The Court expressed particular concern with
the fact that, although Strasbourg had recognised the need for exceptions to the strict application
of article 6(3)(d),1 it had introduced - and reaffirmed - the sole or decisive rule without fully
explaining the underlying principle" and, given that most of its cases concerned procedures from
civil law jurisdictions,59 Strasbourg did not fully consider whether the rule was justified in the
English common law context nor whether English law adequately protected article 6 rights.' The
frorn all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where
the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice" and 6(3)
(d): "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: .... to examine or have examined
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions
as witnesses against him".
50 Al-Khawaja and Tabery v. The UnitedKingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009.
51 Luca v. Italy, no. 33354/96 ("where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been
made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during the
investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees
provided by Article 6", at [40]); affd in Wsser v. the Netherlands, no. 26668/95, 14 Februarv 2002; PS. v. Germany, no.
33900/96, 20 December 2001; Krasniki v. the Czech Republic, no. 51277/99, 28 February 2006. See also Doorson v.
the Netherlands, 26 March 1996 ("Even when 'counterbalancing' procedures are found to compensate sufficiently the
handicaps under which the defence labours, a conviction should not be based either solely or to a decisive extent on
anonymous statements", at [76]).
52 For the defendants Horncastle and Blactmore, a witness had died after giving a statement to police, which was read into
evidence; for the defendants Marquis and Graham, the evidence of a witness who was too afraid to testiy was read into
evidence; and for Carter, evidence that was the product of business records of a corporation was admitted.
53 HRA, s.2(1)(a): "A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right
must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights".
54 R. v. Iorcncastle [2010] 2 A.C. 373 ("There will... be rare occasions where the domestic court has concerns as to whether
a decision of the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In
such circumstances it is open to the domestic court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting
this course.... This is such a case", at [11]).
55 Ibid., at [14].
56 Ibid., at [108].
5' Ibid., at ['3].
58 Ibid., at [80 and 86]. See also ibid. ("The sole or decisive rule has been introduced into the Strasbourg jurisprudence
without discussion of the principle underlying it or full consideration of whether there was justification for imposing the
rule as an overriding principle applicable equally to the continental and common law jurisdictions", at [14]).
59 Ibid. ("Tlie jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court in relation to article 6(3)(d) has developed largely in cases relating to
civil law rather than common law jurisdictions and this is particularly true of the sole or decisive rule", at [107]).
60 Ibid. ("as I have shown that [Strasbourg] case law appears to have developed without full consideration of the safeguards
against an unfair trial that exist under the common law procedure. Nor, I suspect, can the Strasbourg court have given
detailed consideration to the English law of admissibility of evidence, and the changes made to that law, after consideration
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Court ultimately held that the sole or decisive rule was inappropriate because it would "create
severe practical difficulties"" and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, properly construed, adequately
protected article 6 rights. 6
In Al-Khawa ja, the EurCtHR held that hearsay evidence submitted under the Criminal Justice
Act 2003 breached article 6.6 The Supreme Court's lengthy justification in Horncastle for refusing
to follow Al-Khawaja is arguably indicative of how seriously the Court takes Strasbourg jurispru-
dence, and the extent to which it considers departure from Strasbourg "exceptional". However,
references to the possibility of sparking a "valuable dialogue" with the EurCtHR suggest that the
Supreme Court was none too subtly insisting that, even if Strasbourg has given its opinion once,
the judicial conversation on the ECHR between UK courts and Strasbourg does not only travel
downwards and westwards. The Grand Chamber has now heard arguments in Al-KhawaJa. The
value of the "dialogue" and its implication for English law remain to be determined.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent human rights cases illustrate that the Supreme Court takes seriously its obligation to
engage with Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, an important question remains: what criteria
should English courts use to determine when to follow or disregard applicable ECHR rulings?
Pinnock and Horncastle both involved domestic and EurCtHR authority that were inconsistent
with each other, but their outcomes were mirror images. In both cases, the Court gave a list
of relevant considerations (e.g., whether an aspect of English law is "fundamental" or whether
English law was "adequate" despite the assessment of the EurCtHR), but these considerations
arguably provide little guidance for future cases where domestic authority conflicts with that of
the EurCtHR. In contrast, the guidance from Smith and Croydon, is clear: there are firm limits to
the Court's willingness to entertain novel human rights claims. Thatever the Court may do in
the future when its own authority conflicts with that of the Strasbourg Court, it is unlikely to go
beyond the rights as recognised by Strasbourg.
by the Law Commission, intended to ensure that English law [namely, the Criminal Justice Act 20031 complies with the
requirements of article 6(1) (3)(d)", at [10]).
61 Ibid., at [14].
62 Ibid., at [1081.
63 Ibid., at [107.]
64 Ibid. ("This is likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision
that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between the domestic court and the
Strasbourg court", at [11]). See also note 2 above (The Supreme Court in Pinnock wanted to retain the ability of having a
"constructive dialogue" with the EurCtHR).
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